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Abstract
We analyze how the merger of regions a¤ects capital tax competition in a two-tier
territorial organization where both regions and cities share the same mobile tax base.
We identify three e¤ects generated by the merger of regions that impact, either directly
or indirectly, both regional and local tax choices: i) an alleviation of tax competition
at the regional level, ii) a scale e¤ect in the provision of regional public goods, and
iii) a larger internalization of vertical tax externalities generated by cities. We show
that the merger of regions always increases regional tax rates while decreasing local
tax rates. These results are robust to a change in the timing of the game.
Keywords: Mergers, Tax Competition, Fiscal Federalism
JEL classication: H73, H25
1 Introduction
As part of an ongoing process of regionalization in Europe, several European countries
have reduced the number of their regions (Dexia Crédit Local, 2008, 2011) with the aim
of improving the management of public services. Recent examples include Poland, where
the number of "voïvodies" was reduced from 49 to 16 in 1999, and Denmark, where the
territorial reform implemented in 2007 replaced the 13 "amter" with 5 regions. Other
countries including France, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Sweden are also considering
merging regions.
The e¤ect of a merger of same-tier jurisdictions on capital taxation is well-known in
a one-tier territorial organization where jurisdictions compete to attract mobile capital.
Hoyt (1991) demonstrated that tax rates on mobile capital, and thus public goods provi-
sion, increase as the number of jurisdictions decreases. This results from the reduction in
the horizontal tax externality: when a jurisdiction increases its tax rate, the capital inow
to other jurisdictions (that become more attractive) is lower. Decreasing the number of
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jurisdictions reduces the capital movement; thus, increasing the jurisdictions tax rate is
less harmful for that jurisdiction. Considering the possibility of asymmetric mergers, Bu-
covetsky (2009) also concluded that any merger of two same-tier jurisdictions leads to a
higher average tax rate for the federation as a whole due to higher tax rates in jurisdictions
that do not belong to the merger.
The e¤ect of a merger of bottom-tier jurisdictions on capital taxation in a two-tier
territorial organization with several bottom-tier jurisdictions and a unique top-tier juris-
diction, which share a common mobile tax base, has also been studied. The tax base
co-occupation leads to bottom-up vertical tax externalities in addition to horizontal tax
externalities among bottom-tier jurisdictions since bottom-tier jurisdictions ignore the
overall depressive e¤ect that an increase in their tax rate has on the tax base of the unique
top-tier jurisdiction (Keen, 1998; Hoyt, 2001; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002). With hor-
izontal externalities causing ine¢ ciently low tax rates and vertical externalities causing
ine¢ ciently high tax rates, the equilibrium tax rates at the bottom-tier can be either
ine¢ ciently low or high. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004) showed that an increase in the
number of bottom-tier jurisdictions unambiguously deteriorates welfare because ercer
tax competition worsens tax externalities. However, the authors were unable to determine
whether an increase in the number of bottom-tier jurisdictions would increase or decrease
equilibrium tax rates.
Finally, the e¤ect on capital taxation of a "complete merger" of bottom-tier jurisdic-
tions with their top-tier jurisdiction (which is equivalent to removing bottom-tier jurisdic-
tions) in a two-tier territorial organization with several bottom-tier jurisdictions and more
than one top-tier jurisdiction, has also been analyzed. Wrede (1997) compared tax choices
that result from i) a "competition among federations", where n top-tier jurisdictions with
several bottom-tier jurisdictions inside each top-tier jurisdiction compete in a Nash game
to attract mobile capital, with tax choices that result from ii) a "competition among uni-
tary nations", where only n top-tier jurisdictions compete. He demonstrated that if public
goods are substitutes, tax competition among federations leads to less severe underprovi-
sion of public goods (or equally higher taxes) than tax competition among unitary nations.
Grazzini and Petretto (2007) pursued the analysis in a two-country framework, where one
country is federal, consisting of two regions playing as Stackelberg followers with respect
to the federal tier, and the other country is unitary. In this asymmetric setting, the co-
occupation of the mobile tax base generates horizontal tax externalities between the two
countries, in addition to both horizontal externalities at the regional tier and vertical tax
externalities in the federal country. By comparing i) the tax game played between a fed-
eral structure and a unitary structure with ii) the tax game played between two unitary
structures, they showed that the standard "race to the bottom" in the horizontal tax
competition literature, according to which two unitary countries competing for attracting
mobile capital set ine¢ ciently low tax rates at the equilibrium, can be altered by a change
in the institutional setting.
The e¤ect on capital taxation of a merger of top-tier jurisdictions in a two-tier terri-
torial organization with several bottom-tier jurisdictions and several top-tier jurisdictions
is, however, unknown. Should one expect an increase in the equilibrium tax rates set by
top-tier jurisdictions following the merger, as it would be the case in a one-tier setting
(i.e., without bottom-tier jurisdictions)? How does the merger of top-tier jurisdictions af-
fect bottom-tier taxation? What is the consolidated impact for the taxpayer? Our paper
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addresses these issues.
We consider a two-tier territorial organization with several identical bottom-tier juris-
dictions, such as cities, and several identical top-tier jurisdictions, such as regions. Cities
and regions tax the same mobile base, that is the amount of capital invested in their terri-
tory. Benevolent local and regional governments use their tax revenues in order to nance
pure public goods that benet exclusively to their immobile inhabitants. The mobility of
the tax base and its co-occupation by both cities and regions generate a two-tier common-
pool problem with three types of tax externalities : i) horizontal tax externalities among
cities that compete to attract mobile capital, ii) horizontal tax externalities among regions
that compete to attract mobile capital and iii) bilateral vertical tax externalities, that is
top-down and bottom-up externalities, that arise because tax decisions taken at any tier
a¤ect the shared tax base. We thus extend the standard model of capital tax competition
among same-tier jurisdictions developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) by superim-
posing an upper tier composed of several top-tier jurisdictions, in contrast to Keen and
Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) who consider a unique top-tier jurisdiction. Wrede (1997) built
a similar two-tier tax competition model, with the important di¤erence that his bottom-
tier jurisdictions disregard the impact of their tax policy on the budget constraint of their
top-tier jurisdiction and vice-versa, which rules out major vertical tax externalities1.
In view of this elaborate scal federalism structure that complicates the capital tax
competition model, we must make specic assumptions about citizenspreferences and
the production technology to derive a closed form solution. We assume the linearity of
the utility function with respect to private, local and regional public goods consumptions,
which implies constant marginal rates of substitution between these three types of goods.
The decentralized setting allows the coexistence of both local and regional public goods,
and the distortionary e¤ect of capital taxation limits the ability to raise tax revenues and
therefore ensures the coexistence of both private and public goods. We also assume that
the production function is quadratic, so that the demand for capital is a linear function of
the interest rate. Relaxing either one or the other of these two assumptions2 would lead
to the emergence of additional e¤ects linked to the merger in addition to the three e¤ects
described belowand complicate the combination of all e¤ects to such an extent that we
would no longer be able to sign the impact of the merger.
The impact of an exogenous merger of regions on tax rates is rst derived when all
jurisdictions, cities and regions, play simultaneously. We identify three e¤ects generated
by the merger of regions. The rst e¤ect results from the alleviation of tax competition
at the regional level, which reduces horizontal tax externalities among regions, as shown
in the literature (Hoyt, 1991), as well as top-down vertical tax externalities. The merger
decreases the number of competing regions, making tax competition at the regional level
less erce, because of a lower capital movement among regions. Regional taxation is less
distorsive for regions and due to tax base-sharing for their cities, which reduces the
1Our problematic also clearly di¤ers from Wrede (1997), in particular regarding i) the tier concerned
by the merger and ii) the nature of the merger. Indeed, we analyze the e¤ect on tax competition of a
merger of top-tier jurisdictions instead of a merger of bottom-tier jurisdictions, and our merger does not
amount to removing the tier concerned, i.e., there are still some top-tier jurisdictions in our model after
the merger whereas the bottom tier disappears in Wrede (1997).
2 In the tax competition literature, linear preferences are notably assumed by Bucovetsky (2009) and
the quadratic function assumption is used by several papers, including Grazzini and van Ypersele (2003),
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008), Bucovetsky (2009).
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incentive to set ine¢ ciently low regional tax rates. The second e¤ect is a scale e¤ect in
the provision of regional public goods. After the merger, regions (fewer in number) have
a larger tax base at the symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, they can provide more pure
public good for the same tax rate, which increases the marginal utility from the regional
public good provision. Each of these two e¤ects exerts both an upward pressure on regional
tax rates and a downward pressure on local tax rates.
The third e¤ect is the larger internalization of vertical bottom-up tax externalities.
Since cities and regions share the same mobile tax base, a tax increase by a city generates
ceteris paribus a capital outow from the region the city belongs to, because the capital
loss in the given city is higher than the sum of capital gain in other cities that belong to the
same region. Each city accounts for the impact of a change in its tax rate on the regional
tax base, which drives down local tax rates. After the merger, these vertical bottom-up
externalities are internalized for a larger regional tax base. Although the capital loss in
the city which increases its tax rate is still higher than the sum of capital gain in other
cities that belong to the same region, the merger reduces the capital outow for the region
because additional cities with a capital gain join the region. This last e¤ect exerts an
upward pressure on local tax rates and a downward pressure on regional tax rates.
The weighted sum of these three e¤ects determines regional and local tax changes
following a reduction in the number of regions. We show that the merger of regions always
increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates, and that the consolidated tax
rate levied on capital (i.e., the sum of regional and local tax rates) is pushed upwards.
The robustness of these results derived in a Nash game is then challenged by altering
the timing of the game. Instead of a simultaneous play of regions and cities, we consider
two alternative setups: one with regional leadership and the other with local leadership.
When regions are Stackelberg leaders, that is, when they anticipate the impact of their own
tax decision on the choice of taxation by cities, the merger of regions still exerts an upward
pressure on regional tax rates and a downward pressure on local tax rates. However, the
consolidated e¤ect is not clear-cut. On the contrary, when cities are Stackelberg leaders,
that is, when they anticipate the impact of their own tax decision on the choice of taxation
by regions, the outcome of the game is the same as for the simultaneous move Nash game:
the strategic advantage of cities is neutralized by the expectation of the action chosen by
their region.
Our paper contributes to the signicant theoretical literature on tax competition, i)
by building a tax competition model in a two-tier framework with more than one top-tier
jurisdiction where we remove the critical assumption by Wrede (1997) that governments
choose tax rates disregarding the impact on the other tier government, ii) by analyzing how
the merger of regions a¤ects distortions linked to tax competition, where we disentangle the
three e¤ects at work and iii) by comparing the Nash equilibrium, where cities and regions
move simultaneously, and the Stackelberg equilibrium, where either cities or regions move
rst.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the two-tier tax competition
model. In Section 3, we proceed to the analysis of the impact of the merger of regions
on the Nash game played by regional and local players. In Section 4, we investigate the
consequences of the Stackelberg leadership position. Finally, in Section 5, we provide
concluding comments.
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2 The model
The two-tier territorial organization Consider a country with two tiers of sub-
national jurisdictions, for example, regions and cities. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the central/federal jurisdiction plays no role. Before the merger, there are n identical
regions and, within each region, m identical cities, with nm cities altogether in the country.
The merger of regions is a territorial reorganization where former regions are broken
up to constitute new regions, which are fewer in number, that is, en < n. The merger is
exogenously decided; that is, we do not make explicit the forces that lead to a reduction
in the number of regions. The number of cities inside each region changes accordingly;
that is, it increases from3 m to nmen . However, the total number nm of cities, and their
frontiers do not change. Therefore, after the merger, there are en identical regions and,
within each region, nmen identical cities, with nm cities altogether. Let i = 1; :::; en be the
index for regions and j = 1; :::; nmen be the index for cities inside each given region.
Pure public goods are provided at both local and regional tiers, with no spillovers and
no scale economies4. Each local government ij provides a local public good in quantity
gij , which is nanced by the taxation at a rate tij of the amount of capital Kij invested
in its city. The local budget constraint is thus given by gij = tijKij .
Each regional government i provides a regional public good in quantity Gi, which is
nanced by the taxation at a rate  i of the amount of capital Ki employed in region i. As
each region is composed of nmen cities after the merger, the regional tax base Ki amounts
to the sum of local tax bases inside the region, that is, Ki 
nm=enP
j=1
Kij . The regional
budget constraint is thus given by Gi =  i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij . Regional and local governments are
utilitarian and benevolent. They take their budgetary decisions to maximize the utility of
their representative citizen.
The representative citizen Citizens are assumed to be identical5 and immobile.
The representative citizen of the city ij derives a utility v [gij ] from the provision of the
local public good gij , a utility V [Gi] from the provision of the regional public good Gi and
a utility cij from the consumption of a private good in quantity cij . The utility function of
the representative citizen located in ij is thus given by U [cij ; gij ; Gi] = cij+v [gij ]+V [Gi].
Like most papers on capital tax competition, our representative citizen is both the owner
of a unique rm located in its city and the owner of an exogenous amount k of capital.
This amount k can be invested in a rm in any city ij to earn a net return on capital,
denoted by ij , which is equal to the return after local and regional taxes. As we will see
afterwards, ij =  8i;8j at the symmetric equilibrium. The private consumption cij thus
3With a view to realism, we assume that n, ~n, m and nm
~n
are natural numbers. In addition, we consideren > 2.
4Although one of the main reason why a merger of regions may occur is to exploit scale economies, we
abstract from this argument to highlight the pure e¤ect of the merger on tax competition, assuming that
the cost of the regional public good provision does not depend on the size of regions.
5Admittedly, symmetry is a stark assumption; however, it allows us to simplify our analysis and to rule
out any redistributive e¤ects.
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amounts to the sum of the prot of the rm, denoted by ij , and the net remuneration
of the capital endowment, such that cij = ij + k.
Specic assumptions on the functional form of the utility function will be needed to
derive explicit solutions for equilibrium tax rates and to sign the impact of the merger.
As in Bucovetsky (2009), we assume the linearity of the arguments for both private and
public goods consumptions, such that @
2U
@c2ij
= @
2U
@g2ij
= @
2U
@G2i
= 0 where @
2U
@g2ij
 v" [:] and
@2U
@G2i
 V " [:]. As the rst derivative v0 [:] (resp. V 0 [:]) is constant, that is the marginal
value of an additional dollar of local (resp. regional) tax revenue used to provide the local
(resp. regional) public good is a constant, we will subsequently use v0 and V 0 as exogenous
parameters to capture marginal utilities.
The marginal utility derived from the local public good provision gij is proportional to
the one derived from the regional public good provision Gi, that is, v0 = V 0, where  is a
strictly positive parameter that captures the relative preference for the local public good.
In other words, local and regional public goods are perfect substitutes since the marginal
rate of substitution is constant. Alternative public policies to reduce emissions of CO2
or to ensure the security of citizens may be examples of public goods that are perfect
substitutes. This strong assumption of a linear combination between gij and Gi makes
the coexistence of both local and regional public goods only possible in a decentralized
setting, as a central planner would exclusively produce the public good with the highest
valuation in a centralized setting, i.e., gij for v0 > V 0 and Gi for v0 < V 0. In addition, the
distortionary e¤ect of capital taxation limits the ability to raise tax revenues and therefore
ensures the coexistence of both private and public goods, even if public valuation domi-
nates private valuation. In the case of non-distortionary taxation, the linear combination
between private consumption cij and public goods provision, gij or Gi, would entail the
overall taxation of private revenues and, therefore, no private consumption if the public
valuation were higher than the private one (i.e., v0 > 1 at the local tier or nmen V 0 > 1 at the
regional tier). It should be noted that due to the linearity of V [:] w.r.t. Gi, the marginal
utility derived by citizens from a given amount of regional public good provision is not
a¤ected by the merger.
The capital market The capital market is similar to Wrede (1997). That is, it is
a basic one-tier capital market, as modeled by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), on which
an additional tier is superimposed. In contrast to Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004), we
have i) a top tier composed of several jurisdictions rather than one and ii) an exogenous
supply of capital, as in most models of capital tax competition (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986; Wildasin, 1988).
In each city ij, there is a unique rm that is immobile and identical across cities.
The rm borrows an amount of capital Kij on the domestic market6 to produce a com-
posite good in quantity F [Kij ] with F 0 [:] > 0 and F 00 [:] < 0. We make the restrictive
assumption7 that F 000 [:] = 0 to ensure that the demand for capital is linear, thus enabling
us to derive closed form solutions. The prot ij  F [Kij ]   rijKij is, in its entirety,
6The capital market works in autarchy, as both lenders and borrowers reside in the country.
7The quadratic assumption is used by several papers on tax competition, including Grazzini and van
Ypersele (2003), Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008), Bucovetsky (2009).
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transferred to the usual owner of the rm in this type of model, that is, the representative
citizen. Firm prot maximizing behavior implies the familiar condition of remuneration
at the marginal productivity of capital, F 0 [Kij ] = rij 8i;8j. The resulting demand for
capital Kij [rij ] and prot ij [rij ] are decreasing functions of the interest rate rij , that is,
K 0ij [rij ] =
1
F" < 0 and 
0
ij [rij ] =  Kij < 0 8i;8j.
For each unit of capital invested by a capital owner in the rm located in city ij, two
source-based tax rates are levied: a tax rate tij levied by the city ij and a tax rate  i
levied by the region i. The assumption of tax-base sharing, i.e., the fact that both local
and regional jurisdictions independently tax the same mobile tax base, is classic in the
literature on vertical capital tax competition (Keen, 1998; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002).
It is also consistent with empirical evidence; for example, both American states and local
jurisdictions levy taxes on mobile business capital (see Fox, Hill and Murray, 2010, who
empirically tested vertical reaction functions for capital taxes in this country).
Capital is assumed to be mobile without cost in a perfectly competitive market. It
moves across cities and, thus, across regions until it earns the same net return  everywhere,
that is,  = rij   (tij +  i) 8i;8j.
The national supply of capital is the sum of the initial endowment k of the nm rep-
resentative citizens of the country, i.e., nmk. Given that rij =  +  i + tij 8i;8j, the
capital market-clearing condition
enP
i=1
nm=enP
j=1
Kij [+  i + tij ] = nmk implicitly denes the
equilibrium value of the net return on capital,  ( ; t1; :::; ti; :::; ten) with  = (1; ::: en)
and ti = (ti1; :::; tij ; :::; tinmen ) 8i. Di¤erentiating the market-clearing condition yields, at
the symmetric equilibrium:
@
@ i
=
 
nm=enP
j=1
K0ij
enP
i=1
nm=enP
j=1
K0ij
=  1en ; @rij@ i = 1 + @@ i = en 1en ; @rij@ i = @@ i =  1en ;
@
@tij
=
 K0ijenP
i=1
nm=enP
j=1
K0ij
=  1nm ,
@rij
@tij
= 1 + @@tij =
nm 1
nm ,
@rij
@t ij =
@rij
@ti; j =
@
@t ij =
@
@ti; j =
 1
nm :
The mobility of the tax base and its co-occupation by both cities and regions generate
a two-tier common-pool problem. Regional and local tax choices both a¤ect the location
choice of capital since the net return on capital decreases when the cumulative tax rate
 i + tij 8i;8j increases. Therefore, three types of tax externalities emerge in our two-tier
setting:
i) horizontal externalities at the local level. Since capital is perfectly mobile, each city
individually has an incentive to reduce its tax rate on capital to attract a larger tax base,
i.e.,  K 0ij @rij@tij > 0, which generates a negative externality towards the other cities by
shrinking their tax base, i.e.,  K 0lk @@tij < 0 8l 6= i;8k and  K 0ik
@
@tij
< 0 8k 6= j. Thus, the
other cities must reduce their tax rate to retain their tax base. This strategic behavior
leads to a downward spiral in tax rates, usually called the "race to the bottom", as each
city tries to undercut the others by setting an attractive tax rate. Equilibrium tax rates
are, therefore, lower than those that would be chosen under coordination.
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ii) horizontal externalities at the regional level. Each region similarly undercuts the
other regions via the choice of its tax rate. The strategic choice of reducing its tax rate  i
expands the region is tax base, i.e.,  
nm=enP
j=1
K 0ij
@rij
@ i
> 0 but hurts the other regions, i.e.,
 
nm=enP
j=1
K 0lj
@
@ i
< 0 8l 6= i. However, regional tax competition is less erce than local tax
competition because the number of competitors is lower, thus, implying that regional tax
externalities are weaker. This is captured by the fact that the impact on the net return on
capital of the regional tax rate is lower than the one of the local tax rate, i.e., @@tij >
@
@ i
.
iii) vertical externalities between local and regional tiers. Cities and regions indepen-
dently tax the same mobile tax base, which generates both bottom-up externalities (as
the tax choice of a city a¤ects the en regions) and top-down tax externalities8 (as the tax
choice of a region a¤ects the nm cities). Suppose rst that the city ij reduces its tax
rate tij . Ceteris paribus, capital will leave other cities in region i as well as cities in other
regions, to locate in city ij, thus creating an overall positive impact on region is tax
base9, i.e.,  
nm=enP
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
 K 0ij @rij@tij > 0, and a negative impact on other regions l 6= i, i.e.,
 
nm=enP
j=1
K 0lj
@
@tij
< 0, at the symmetric equilibrium (K 0ik = K
0
ij < 0 for all i; k; j). Suppose
now that the region i reduces its tax rate  i. Ceteris paribus, capital will leave cities that
belong to other regions (l 6= i) to locate in the nmen cities that belong to region i. The
capital inow for region i is  
nm=enP
j=1
K 0ij
@rij
@ i
> 0. Therefore, this creates positive vertical
top-down externalities for each city ij inside region i, i.e.,  K 0ij @rij@ i > 0 8i; j, but also
negative vertical top-down externalities for each city lj of other regions, i.e.,  K 0lj @@ i < 08l 6= i;8j.
To summarize, the choice of a jurisdictions tax rate a¤ects its own tax base, the tax
base of other same-tier jurisdictions and the tax base of other-tier jurisdictions, because
of the combination of tax-base sharing and mobility.
Wrede (1997) assumes that "each government takes only its own budget restriction
into consideration", although each tier maximizes the utility of its representative citizen,
which depends on both bottom-tier and top-tier public goods provisions (as in our model).
Therefore, the bottom-tier does not take into account the impact of its tax choice on
the provision of top-tier public goods, and vice-versa. A major di¤erence with Wrede
is that we depart from this simplication, which has important consequences in terms
of internalization of tax externalities. As shown later, each city will internalize part of
8 In Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004), there are only bottom-up vertical tax externalities, due to
the fact that the public good is a publicly provided private good. The absence of top-down vertical tax
externalities is explained by the fact that the utility function of the unique top-tier government is the sum
of the utility of all bottom-tier jurisdictions and therefore the top-tier jurisdiction perfectly internalizes
top-down externalities. This is no longer the case with several top-tier jurisdictions.
9At the symmetric equilibrium, K0ik = K
0
ij < 0 for all i; k; j, so  
nm=enP
k 6=j
K0ik
@
@tij
  K0ij @rij@tij =  (
nmen  
1)K0ik
@
@tij
 K0ij @rij@tij =  K
0
ij(
nmen @@tij + 1) > 0.
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the bottom-up tax externalities, i.e., it will take into account the impact of a change in
its local tax rate on the public goods provided by its region, but not by other regions.
Additionally, each region will internalize part of the top-down tax externalities, i.e., it
will take into account the impact of a change in its regional tax rate on the public goods
provided by cities located in its region, but not by cities located in other regions. Thus,
the internalization of vertical tax externalities, whether bottom-up or top-down, will be
partial.
Finally, let " i =
@(
nm=enP
j=1
Kij)
@ i
 i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij
< 0 denote the elasticity of capital invested in
region i with respect to region is tax rate and "tij =
@Kij
@tij
tij
Kij
< 0 denote the elasticity
of capital invested in city ij with respect to city ijs tax rate. A change in the tax rate
tij (resp.  i) produces two opposite e¤ects on tax revenues: (i) a direct positive e¤ect
Kijdtij (resp.
nm=enP
j=1
Kijd i) and (ii) an indirect negative e¤ect through the net return
on capital "tijKijdtij (resp. " i
nm=enP
j=1
Kijd i). Consistent with empirical ndings10, we
postulate that elasticities belong to the interval ]   1; 0[, which implies
@( i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij)
@ i
=
(1 + " i)
nm=enP
j=1
Kij > 0 and
@(tijKij)
@tij
=
 
1 + "tij

Kij > 0. Therefore, tax revenues of
a jurisdiction always increase when the jurisdictions tax rate increases. Because our
governments are benevolent, these additional tax revenues are entirely used to produce
more public goods.
The impact of the merger on the capital market We rst note that the impact
of local taxation on the net return, @@tij 8i;8j; remains the same whatever the number of
regions, en, as the total number of cities, nm, does not change. The merger of regions,
therefore, has no impact on the erceness of horizontal tax competition at the local level,
i.e., @@en( @@tij ) = @@en(@rij@tij ) = 0. Due to symmetry and a xed supply of capital, we will show
that the allocation of capital among cities does not change.
In contrast, the merger of regions reduces the impact of an increase in the regional tax
rate on both the net return on capital and the interest rate, i.e., @@en( @@ i ) = @@en(@rij@ i ) = 1en2 .
Horizontal tax competition for capital at the regional level becomes less erce. In other
words, the market share of each region, which is equal to the inverse of the number of
regions, increases with the merger. It should be noted that @@ i =  1 and
@rij
@ i
= 0 when
capital is completely inelastic or without regional tax competition for capital.
The merger of regions also increases each regional tax base since the xed national
supply of capital nmk is equally divided among fewer regions at the symmetric equilibrium,
i.e.,
nm=enP
j=1
Kij >
mP
j=1
Kij .
10See Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) for instance.
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The timing of the game Regional and local governments play a Nash game. Re-
gional governments simultaneously select their tax rate to maximize the welfare of the
representative citizen residing within their region, taking as given tax rates chosen by the
other regions and cities. Simultaneously, local governments select their tax rate to max-
imize the welfare of the representative citizen residing within their city, taking as given
tax rates chosen by the other cities and regions.
Regional and local public goods are determined as residuals after taxes are collected.
Firms then choose the amount of capital that maximizes their prots given these tax poli-
cies and production takes place. Finally, prots are distributed, and citizens enjoy the
consumption of both private and public goods. These last two stages are implicitly intro-
duced in our analysis: regional and local governments take into account the reaction of the
capital demand when choosing their tax strategy11, and as regional and local governments
are benevolent, citizenspreferences guide the choices of governments.
The robustness of the results derived in the Nash game will then be challenged by
altering the timing of the game. Instead of a simultaneous play of regions and cities, we
will consider two alternative setups:
i) a Stackelberg game where regional governments move rst. Regional leaders move
rst and then local followers move sequentially. In being the rst to choose their tax rate,
regional governments possess a commitment power.
ii) a Stackelberg game where local governments move rst. Local leaders move rst,
choosing their best tax strategy. Regional followers then observe local choices and select
their tax rate.
3 Mergers in a simultaneous move Nash game
All jurisdictions, cities and regions, simultaneously choose their tax rates, given the strate-
gies of the other players. After solving the regional governments problem and the local
governments problem, we will determine the impact on tax rates of a reduction in the
number of regions using comparative statics.
3.1 The regional governments problem
Each regional government i for i = 1; :::; en chooses the tax rate  i, which maximizes the
utility of the representative citizen located in its region, taking as given the tax choices of
other regions and cities. It thus solves the problem:
Max
 i
nm=enP
j=1
(cij + v [gij ] + V [Gi])
s.t. cij = ij [rij ] + k, gij = tijKij [rij ] and Gi =  i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij [rij ] :
11The strategic variable is the tax rate because our aim is to analyze the impact of mergers on tax
competition. However, in line with Wildasin (1988), we could show that Nash (resp. Stackelberg) equilibria
in which tax rates are the strategic variables do not coincide with Nash (resp. Stackelberg) equilibria in
which the amount of public good is the strategic variable, because the public good provision does not a¤ect
the location of capital.
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The rst-order condition12:
nm=enP
j=1
 
0ij
@rij
@ i
+
@
@ i
k + v0tijK 0ij
@rij
@ i
+ V 0 (1 + " i)
nm=enP
j=1
Kij
!
= 0; (1)
determines the regional governments reaction function f i(t1; :::; ti; :::; ten;  i)gi, which
depends on the vector ti = (ti1; :::; tinmen ) of local tax rates in each region i = 1; :::; en and
on the vector  i = (1; :::;  i 1;  i+1; :::;  en) of other regional tax rates. According to (1),
each region i determines its tax rate to equalize the marginal costs of a reduction in private
consumption and local public good provision, that is, @cij@ i + v
0 @gij
@ i
< 0, and the marginal
benet of a rise in regional public good provision, that is, V 0 @Gi@ i = V
0 (1 + " i)
nm=enP
j=1
Kij >
0, following an increase in  i.
3.2 The local governments problem
Simultaneously, each local government ij for i = 1; :::; en and j = 1; :::; nmen chooses the tax
rate tij , which maximizes the utility of the representative citizen located in its city, taking
as given the tax choices of other cities and regions. It thus solves the problem:
Max
tij
cij + v [gij ] + V [Gi]
s.t. cij = ij [rij ] + k, gij = tijKij [rij ] and Gi =  i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij [rij ] :
From the rst-order condition13,
0ij
@rij
@tij
+
@
@tij
k + v0
 
1 + "tij

Kij + V
0 i
 P
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
+K 0ij
@rij
@tij
!
= 0 (2)
we determine the local governments reaction function ftij( ; t1; :::; ti; j; :::; ten)gij , which
depends on the vector tk = (tk1; :::; tk nmen ) of local tax rates in each region k = 1; :::; i  
1; i + 1; :::; en, on the vector ti; j = (ti1; :::; tij 1; tij+1; :::; tinmen ) of tax rates of cities other
than ij in region i and on the vector  = (1; :::;  i; :::;  en) of regional tax rates. The
tax rate chosen by the local government ij is such that it equalizes the marginal costs
of a reduction in private consumption and regional public good provision, that is, @cij@tij +
V 0 @Gi@tij < 0, and the marginal benet of a rise in local public good provision, that is,
v0 @gij@tij = v
0  1 + "tijKij > 0, following an increase in tij .
12At the symmetric equilibrium, distortive e¤ects  through the net return on capital  on private
consumption compensate each other, i.e., 0ij
@
@i
+ @
@i
k = 0 since 0ij =  Kij and Kij = k 8i;8j,
implying that @cij
@i
= 0ij < 0.
13At the symmetric equilibrium, distortive e¤ects  through the net return on capital  on private
consumption compensate each other, implying that @cij
@tij
= 0ij < 0. Furthermore, marginal demands
for capital are identical, i.e., K0ik = K
0
ij 8i; j; k, implying that @Gi@tij =  i((m  1)K
0
ij
@
@tij
+ K0ij
@rij
@tij
) =
 i(1 +m
@
@tij
)K0ij .
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Solving rst-order conditions (1) and (2) for all cities and regions simultaneously de-
termines the Nash equilibrium levels of tax rates. In the remainder of the paper, results
will be derived provided that a set of conditions specied in Appendix A are satised.
The condition (5) derived from the regional SOC, i.e., 2nmen V 0  @rij@ i , and the condi-
tion (6) derived from the local SOC, i.e., 2v0  @rij@tij , ensure the concavity of regional
and local objective functions and the uniqueness of the solution. Marginal utilities from
public goods must be high enough to avoid a corner solution. The condition (8), i.e.,
(nmen V 0   1)(nm 1nm = en 1en )  (v0   1), guarantees that regional tax rates chosen at the sym-
metric equilibrium are positive and the condition (9), i.e., (v0   1)  (nmen V 0   1) ennm ,
guarantees that local tax rates chosen at the symmetric equilibrium are positive. These
two conditions of positivity determine a non-empty range of parameters , which ensures
that both local and regional tax rates are positive. Beyond this interval, either local or
regional public goods will not be produced. The condition (9) states that the relative
preference for the local public good  = v
0
V 0 must be su¢ ciently high to ensure that local
public goods are produced. Similarly, the condition (8) states that the relative preference
for the local public good  must not exceed a threshold value beyond which regional pub-
lic goods would no longer be produced. Indeed, for high values of v0 relative to V 0, the
marginal cost of a reduction in the local public good provision may exceed the marginal
benet from a higher provision of the regional public good, following a rise in  i; therefore,
the regional tax rate  i will be set to 0. In addition, as shown in Lemma 2 in Appendix
A, the conditions of positivity require that the marginal utility derived from the provision
of the public good (whether local or regional) exceeds the marginal utility derived from
the provision of the private good (normalized to unity), i.e., v0 > 1 and nmen V 0 > 1. If this
were not the case, governments would not levy tax revenues to nance public goods.
3.3 Implications of the merger of regions
We now use the comparative statics to examine in more detail the impact of the merger of
regions on regional and local tax rates. Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions (1) and
(2) with respect to  i, tij and en and using Cramers rule, we have:
@ i
@en = 1AN ((E1 + E2) HORIREG   E3  V ERTI) (3)
and @tij@en = 1AN (  (E1 + E2)  V ERTI + E3 HORILOC) ; (4)
where the expressions AN , E1, E2, E3, HORIREG, HORILOC and V ERTI are dened
in Appendix B. Since AN > 0 (see Lemma 3 in Appendix B), the impact of the merger
of regions on regional tax rates, i.e., @ i@en , and the impact of the merger of regions on local
tax rates, i.e., @tij@en , depend on the interplay of three e¤ects, E1, E2 and E3, which are
transmitted either horizontally (at a weight HORIREG or HORILOC) or vertically (at a
weight VERTI).
The rst e¤ect, E1   (v0tij + V 0 nmen  i)K 0ij @(@=@ i)@en > 0, results from the alleviation
of horizontal tax competition at the regional level. By reducing the number of competing
regions, the merger makes tax competition at the regional level less erce due to lower
capital movement. A region is tax increase generates less capital outow from region i
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(and therefore less capital inow to other regions) since the marginal impact @@ i of the
regional tax rate on the equilibrium value of the net return on capital  becomes lower,
i.e.,  @(@=@ i)@en < 0. The merger thus reduces horizontal tax externalities at the regional
level, as shown by Hoyt (1991). Because of tax-base sharing, it also reduces vertical
top-down tax externalities: a region is tax increase generates less capital outow from
cities ij 8j located in its territory and less capital inow to cities located in other regions.
The reduction in horizontal tax externalities increases the marginal utility derived from
the regional public good ( V 0 nmen  iK 0ij @(@rij=@ i)@en > 0) and the reduction in vertical top-
down tax externalities increases the marginal utility derived from the local public good
( v0tijK 0ij @(@rij=@ i)@en > 0) without changing the cost in terms of private consumption, thus
lowering the incentive for regional governments to set ine¢ ciently low tax rates.
The second e¤ect, E2   V 0 @(nm=en)@en (1 + " i)Kij > 0, is a scale e¤ect in the provi-
sion of regional public goods. After the merger, regions (fewer in number) have larger
tax bases at the symmetric equilibrium. More tax revenues can be collected and thus a
greater amount of regional public good can be provided after the merger, for the same tax
rate. The marginal utility derived from a regional tax increase becomes higher without
changing the cost in terms of private consumptionthus pushing up the regional tax rate.
This e¤ect is strongly linked to our assumption that the regional good is a pure public
good, the cost of provision of the regional public good being the same whatever the size of
regions (or, equally, whatever the number of public good "consumers" in each region). In
case of a publicly provided private good at the regional level, E2 would disappear without
altering the whole impact @ i@en of the merger on the regional tax rate, as shown in the bullet
point "Sign of @
N
i
@en " in Appendix C.
The third e¤ect, E3   V 0 i @@en(P
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
+ K 0ij
@rij
@tij
) =  V 0 iK 0ij
@

1+nmen @@tij

@en > 0,
captures the larger internalization of vertical bottom-up tax externalities. Each city ij
neglects the impact its tax choice tij has on the provision of local public goods in other
cities (whether they belong to the same region or not), i.e. it does not internalize horizontal
externalities at the local tier. However each city ij accounts for the impact of its tax
choice tij on the regional public good provided inside its region, i.e., it internalizes vertical
bottom-up externalities for its region (but not for other regions). As described before, if
city ij increases its tax rate tij , this generates a capital outow from city ij as well as a
capital outow from region i, because the capital outow from city ij partially relocates
in cities outside of region i. City ij accounts for this capital movement out of region i
when choosing its tax rate, which drives down local tax rates. Due to symmetry in our
model, the capital outow from city ij is equally distributed among all the other cities of
the country, which implies that the amount of capital outow from region i is in inverse
proportion to the number of cities inside region i. The larger region i, the lower the capital
outow from region i (as more cities are located inside of region i), and as a result, the
lower the incentive for each city ij to reduce its tax rate. By increasing the size of regions,
the merger thus leads each city to internalize vertical bottom-up externalities for a larger
regional tax base. In the extreme case where all regions merge to form a unique top-tier
jurisdiction, vertical bottom-up tax externalities would be entirely internalized. Note that
for K 0ij = 0 8j, capital becomes inelastic to a change in the gross return on capital, and
all of these e¤ects vanish.
13
The rst two e¤ects, E1 and E2, are considered as regional because they originate from
the regional tier, whereas the third one, E3, is considered as local because it originates
from the local tier14. Due to the two-tier territorial organization, these three e¤ects are
both horizontally transmitted, i.e., at the regional (resp. local) tier if they are regional
(resp. local) at a weight HORIREG (resp. HORILOC), and vertically transmitted, i.e.,
at the regional (resp. local) tier if they are local (resp. regional) at a weight V ERTI15.
Each e¤ect taken individually favors an increase in tax pressure when it is horizontally
transmitted: the alleviation of horizontal tax competition at the regional level (E1) and
the scale e¤ect in the provision of regional public goods (E2) both drive regional tax rates
upwards, whereas the larger internalization of vertical bottom-up tax externalities (E3)
yields to higher local tax rates following a decrease in en. However, due to the overlapping
structure, each e¤ect is also vertically transmitted, either top-down (for E1 and E2) or
bottom-up (E3), where it favors a decrease in tax pressure: the alleviation of horizontal
tax competition at the regional level (E1) and the scale e¤ect in the provision of regional
public goods (E2) both tend to reduce local tax rates, whereas the larger internalization
of vertical bottom-up tax externalities (E3) encourages regions to lower their tax rate
following the merger of regions.
The overall impact of the merger on tax rates, @ i@en and @tij@en , is a weighted sum of these
three e¤ects, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically. By summing @ i@en and
@tij
@en , we nd the impact of the merger of regions on the consolidated tax rate Tij   i+ tij .
It follows that:
Proposition 1: In a Nash game, the merger of regions always increases regional tax
rates and decreases local tax rates, with an overall increasing impact on the consolidated
tax rate.
Proof: See Appendix C
The merger of regions has an unambiguous impact on both regional and local tax rates.
Following the territorial reorganization, regions, fewer in number, increase their tax rates,
whereas cities reduce their tax rates. We learn from Proposition 1 that the weighted sum
of the alleviation of horizontal tax competition at the regional level and the scale e¤ect in
the provision of regional public goods, i.e., E1 and E2 (which are transmitted at a weight
HORIREG at the regional level and V ERTI at the local level), is higher than the larger
internalization of vertical bottom-up tax externalities, i.e., E3 (which is transmitted at a
weight V ERTI at the regional level and HORILOC at the local level).
If the linear utility assumption were relaxed, the three e¤ects E1, E2, E3 would
still exist. Assuming strictly concave functions v(:) and V(:), two new e¤ects E4 
 V " i @(nm=en)@en Kij (1 + " i)P
j
Kij and E5   V " i @(nm=en)@en Kij i(P
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
+K 0ij
@rij
@tij
) would
appear and the three weights HORIREG, HORILOC and V ERTI would be stronger.
However, new conditions of concavity and the inability to derive equilibrium tax rates
would prevent us from signing @ i@en and @tij@en without introducing a set of strong ad-hoc as-
sumptions. Similar statements can be made concerning the quadratic production function
14The derivative of the regional FOC (1) w.r.t. en amounts to E1 +E2. The derivative of the local FOC
(2) w.r.t. en amounts to E3.
15HORIREG amounts to the local SOC, HORILOC amounts to the regional SOC and V ERTI
amounts to the cross-partial derivative.
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assumption.
In the case of coalitions of regions16 that coordinate to jointly choose their tax rate, the
territorial organization would not change; that is, the number of regions and the number
of cities inside each region would remain stable. The three e¤ects E1, E2, E3 would thus
be absent. In particular, the impact of regional taxation on the net return would not
change after the coalition of regions, i.e., @@ i =
1
n .
4 Mergers in a Stackelberg game
We now test whether our results are robust to a change in the timing of the game by
considering two alternative sequences of decisions. First, we assume that regional govern-
ments act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis local governments. The larger size of higher-tier
jurisdictions may be a reason to justify regional leadership (see Keen and Kotsogiannis,
2003, for instance). Second, we assume that local governments act as Stackelberg leaders
vis-à-vis regional governments. A recent literature on the soft budget constraint issue
applied to scal federalism uses local leadership to capture the weakness of the higher-tier
in terms of intergovernmental transfers (Vigneault, 2007; Breuillé and Vigneault, 2010).
The leader moves rst and chooses the tax rate that maximizes the welfare over its
territory, anticipating the predicted response of the follower. The follower then observes
the decision of the leader and in equilibrium selects its tax rate as a response.
4.1 Regional governments are Stackelberg leaders
When regional governments are Stackelberg leaders, they anticipate the impact of their
own tax decision on the choice of taxation by local governments. Best response functionsbtij ( i) of local followers are calculated by di¤erentiating rst-order conditions (2) by tij
and  i for all i = 1; :::; en and j = 1; :::; nmen . At the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain17:
@btij
@ i
=  
(v0
@rij
@i
+V 0(1+nmen @@tij )  @rij@tij @rij@i )
(2v0  @rij
@tij
)
@rij
@tij
2]  1; 0[ 8i;8j:
As expected18, local reaction functions are negative. Local and regional tax rates are
therefore strategic substitutes, which implies that all local governments j located in region
i will respond to a rise in  i by reducing their tax rates tij to restore some competitiveness.
It should be noted that
@(@btij=@ i)
@en < 0, that is, the higher the number of regions, the more
responsive the local tax rate to a change in the regional tax rate.
Regional leaders select the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the representative
citizen located in their region, anticipating the predicted response of local followers, i.e.,
16Contrary to Konrad and Schjelderup (1999), all regions would be partitioned into coalitions, i.e., en
exogenous coalitions of nen regions.
17We know that @
btij
@i
2]   1; 0[ since ( en 1en =nm 1nm ) < 1, 2v0 > nm 1nm from (6) and V 0 < v0 = V 0 from
Lemma 1 (see Appendix A).
18See for instance Fox, Hill and Murray (2010).
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Max
 i
nm=enP
j=1
(cij + v [gij ] + V [Gi])
s.t. cij = ij [rij ] + k, gij = tijKij [rij ] , Gi =  i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij [rij ] and btij ( i) 8j:
Let us use the exponent SR (resp. SL) to characterize the equilibrium when regional
(resp. local) governments are leaders and the exponent N to characterize the Nash equi-
librium. The comparison between SRi and 
N
i and the comparison between t
SR
ij and t
N
ij
both crucially depend on the relative extent of marginal utilities. For nmen V 0 > v0, regional
tax rates chosen at the Stackelberg equilibrium are higher than those chosen at the Nash
equilibrium, i.e., SRi > 
N
i 8i. Because of the substitutability between local and regional
tax rates, equilibrium tax rates chosen by local governments when they are followers are
lower, i.e., tSRij < t
N
ij 8i;8j. For nmen V 0 < v0, results are opposite (see Appendix D for
proof): when the regional public good valuation is low with respect to the local public
good valuation, the regional leader sets a tax rate which is lower than the tax rate that
would be chosen in a Nash game and thus produces less regional public good in order to
maximize the welfare of the representative citizen, being aware that it will increase the
local tax rate, and as a consequence the local public good provision. Regional governments
thus do not always use their strategic advantage to set higher regional tax rates: the be-
havior of the regional leader will depend on whether an increase in the regional public
good or an increase in the local public good generates more additional utility to citizens.
We then calculate the impact of the merger of regions on both regional and local tax
rates by di¤erentiating the system of rst-order conditions w.r.t.  i, tij and en, taking into
account btij ( i). The results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In a Stackelberg game where regions are leaders, the merger of regions
always increases regional tax rates and decreases local tax rates.
Proof: See Appendix D
Although some new e¤ects capturing the impact of the merger on the reaction function
emerge in the Stackelberg game when regions are leaders, in addition to the three existing
e¤ects E1, E2 and E3, we are able to show that the merger of regions leads to higher
regional tax rates and lower local tax rates at the symmetric equilibrium. Results derived
in a Nash game for both local and regional tax rates are therefore robust to this change in
sequence of decisions. However, we are unable to sign the consolidated impact of a merger
of regions without assuming more restrictive conditions. Let us now reverse the sequence
of decisions and assume local leadership rather than regional leadership.
4.2 Local governments are Stackelberg leaders
In the same way, we solve the game by backward induction to derive the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. We rst calculate the best response function of each regional follower
by di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions (1) by tij and  i for all i = 1; :::; en and j =
16
1; :::; nmen . At the symmetric equilibrium19, we obtain20:
@b i
@tij
=  
(v0+V 0  @rij
@tij
)
(2V 0 nmen   @rij@i )
2]  1; 0[ 8i;8j:
Regional reaction functions are also negative, which conrms that local and regional tax
rates are strategic substitutes.
Each local government ij selects the tax rate tij that maximizes the utility of its
representative citizen, anticipating the predicted response of the region i, i.e.,
Max
tij
cij + v [gij ] + V [Gi]
s.t. cij = ij [rij ] + k, gij = tijKij [rij ] , Gi =  i
nm=enP
j=1
Kij [rij ] and b i (tij) 8j:
As shown in Appendix E, the Stackelberg strategy is equivalent to the Nash strategy,
i.e., local FOCs when cities are Stackelberg leaders boil down to local FOCs when cities
play simultaneously with regions. Their rst move does not give cities an advantage,
and therefore, tax rates chosen at the equilibrium in the sequential game are identical
to those chosen in the simultaneous game. This strong result is explained by a mix of
two ingredients: the symmetry and the overlapping structure. Because of symmetry and
provided that both local and regional governments are benevolent and utilitarian, the
regional objective function is equivalent to the local objective function multiplied by the
number nm=en of cities inside the region. Therefore, the derivative of the regional objective
function w.r.t.  i is identical to the derivative of the local objective function w.r.t.  i
weighted by nmen . This is the case only because the regional tax rate  i has the same
impact for all cities inside the region since it is a top-tier policy21. The anticipation of the
predicted response thus leads local leaders to not alter their best response, since it mimics
the action of the regional follower. Cities are not better o¤ in this case than they are in
the simultaneous move case. As summarized by the following proposition, results are the
same as in the Nash game:
Proposition 3: Local leadership does not a¤ect the outcome of the Nash game; that
is, tax rates are identical ( SLi = 
N
i , t
SL
ij = t
N
ij ) and the impact on taxation of the merger
is the same (
@tSLij
@en = @tNij@en > 0, @SLi@en = @Ni@en < 0, @TSLij@en = @TNij@en < 0).
Proof: See Appendix E
19Before simplication, the di¤erentiated equation is  K0ij( @rij@i d i +
@rij
@tij
dtij)
@rij
@i
+ v0K0ij
@rij
@i
dtij +
V 0(
nm=enP
j=1
K0ij
@rij
@i
d i +
P
k 6=j
K0ik
@
@tij
dtij +K
0
ij
@rij
@tij
dtij +
nm=enP
j=1
K0ij
@rij
@i
d i) = 0:
20We know that @bi
@tij
< 0 because nmen V 0 > 1 > @rij@i and v0 = V 0 > 1 > @rij@tij from Lemma 2 (Appendix
A), and that
 @bi@tij  < 1, which we proved in Appendix C.
21With regional leadership, this equivalence no longer holds because the region takes into account the
impact of a given citys tax choice on the city itself and also on the other cities located in its territory.
Therefore, the regional leader internalizes part of the local externalities when picking its tax rate rst,
whereas the city does not. Mathematically speaking, the derivative of the regional objective function
w.r.t. tij is not identical to the derivative of the local objective function w.r.t. tij .
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Results derived in a Nash game are therefore robust to this change in sequence of
decisions.
5 Conclusion
In a two-tier tax competition model with several top-tier jurisdictions, which generates: i)
horizontal tax externalities at both top and bottom tiers and ii) top-down and bottom-up
vertical tax externalities, our paper analyzes the impact of a merger of top-tier jurisdictions
on tax policies. Two top-tier (or regional) e¤ects and one bottom-tier (or local) e¤ect,
both of which are horizontally and vertically transmitted, result from the merger. The
two regional e¤ects are found to overcome the local e¤ect. Therefore, the merger of
regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates, with an overall positive
impact on the consolidated tax rate. In case of a sequential move, with either local or
regional leadership, the merger still exacerbates the race to the bottom at the local tier
while reducing it at the regional tier. The equilibrium with local leadership has the
special feature of being equivalent to the equilibrium with simultaneous moves due to the
overlapping structure of taxation in our symmetric framework.
Several extensions can be considered to improve our understanding of the consequences
of a merger of regions on tax competition in this two-tier framework, and thus to fuel
the debate on territorial reorganization that has taken place in most OECD countries.
It would be desirable to allow for more general functional forms of the utility function
and the production function, without being obliged to introduce a new set of strong ad-
hoc assumptions in compensation. The symmetry assumption could also be relaxed by
considering that regions di¤er in terms of population or that only some regions merge.
The determinants of the merger may also be endogenous, which would raise new issues
concerning the stability of mergers of jurisdictions. Finally, future research could consider
other types of territorial reforms such as the merger of jurisdictions that belong to two
di¤erent tiers, for example, the merger of a region and some cities.
6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Conditions of concavity and positivity
 Conditions of concavity
The concavity of the regional governments problem is ensured when the SOC (2nmen V 0 
@rij
@ i
)K 0ij
@rij
@ i
 0 is satised. The concavity of the local governments problem is ensured
when the SOC (2v0   @rij@tij )K 0ij
@rij
@tij
 0 is satised. Since K 0ij < 0, @rij@ i > 0 and
@rij
@tij
> 0,
the SOCs are satised under the two following assumptions:
2nmen V 0  @rij@ i ; (5)
2v0  @rij@tij : (6)
 Conditions of positivity
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At the symmetric equilibrium, the amount of capital Kij invested in each city ij is
equal to the exogenous amount of capital k each representative citizen is initially endowed
with. Using Kij = k 8i;8j, we know that @cij@ i =
@cij
@tij
= 0ij =  k and K 0ij = 1F"[k] 8i;8j.
The FOCs (1) and (2) thus reduce to:(
 k + v0tijK 0ij @rij@ i + V 0(nmen k +  i nmen K 0ij @rij@ i ) = 0;
 k + v0(k + tijK 0ij @rij@tij ) + V 0 i(1 + nmen @@tij )K 0ij = 0
Solving this system of FOCs for all regions and cities simultaneously, we derive the
tax rates chosen by regions and cities at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted by Ni
and tNij , 8i;8j:
Ni =
(nmen V 0 1)(nm 1nm = en 1en ) (v0 1)
 V 0K0ij nm enen k and t
N
ij =
(v0 1)nmen  (nmen V 0 1)
 v0K0ij nm enen k: (7)
As tax rates must be positive by assumption to ensure that public goods are provided,
the following conditions of positivity are required22 8i;8j:
(nmen V 0   1)(nm 1nm = en 1en )   v0   1 (8) 
v0   1  (nmen V 0   1) ennm (9)
It should be noted that we checked that the set of parameters that satises conditions of
concavity and conditions of positivity is not empty.
 Implications of the conditions of positivity
Lemma 1:  > 1
Proof: Replacing v0 by its value V 0, the condition (9) reduces to (  1) nmen V 0 
nmen   1. Because nmen   1 > 0, we know that  can never be lower than 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: nmen V 0 > 1 and v0 > 1
Proof: Combining the conditions of positivity (8) and (9), we know that (nmen V 0  
1)(nm 1nm =
en 1en )  (nmen V 0 1) ennm , which boils down to the condition (nmen V 0 1)(nm enen 1 )  0.
Because nm > en, we deduce that nmen V 0 > 1. Therefore, from the condition (9), we can
infer that v0 > 1. Q.E.D.
6.2 Appendix B: Comparative statics
Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions (1) and (2) with respect to  i, tij and en yields
the following system of equations in matrix form:26666664
(2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i )K 0ij @rij@ i
 K 0ij @rij@tij
@rij
@ i
+ v0K 0ij
@rij
@ i
+V 0(
P
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
+K 0ij
@rij
@tij
)
 K 0ij @rij@ i
@rij
@tij
+ v0K 0ij
@rij
@ i
+V 0(
P
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
+K 0ij
@rij
@tij
) (2v
0   @rij@tij )K 0ij
@rij
@tij
37777775
"
@Ni
@en
@tNij
@en
#
=
26664 v0tijK 0ij @

@rij
@i

@en   V 0
@((1+"i)
nm=enP
j=1
Kij)
@en
 V 0 i
@(
P
k 6=j
K0ik
@
@tij
+K0ij
@rij
@tij
)
@en
37775
22The need for conditions of positivity is explained by the linearity of the utility derived from local and
regional public goods.
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Using Cramers rule gives:
@Ni
@en = BNAN and @tNij@en = CNAN ;
where23:
AN = K 02ij ((2V
0 nmen   @rij@ i )@rij@ i (2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij   ( @rij@ i @rij@tij + v0 @rij@ i + V 0(1 + nmen @@tij ))2);
BN = K 02ij
0BBBBB@
 @

@rij
@i

@en (v0tij + V 0 nmen  i)(2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij
+
@(nmen )
@en V 0( K0ij)(Kij +  iK 0ij @rij@ i )(2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij
+
@

1+nmen @@tij

@en V 0 i( @rij@tij @rij@ i + v0 @rij@ i + V 0(1 + nmen @@tij ))
1CCCCCA ;
CN = K 02ij
0BBBBB@
@

@rij
@i

@en (v0tij + V 0 nmen  i)( @rij@ i @rij@tij + v0 @rij@ i + V 0(1 + nmen @@tij ))
+
@(nmen )
@en V 0K0ij (Kij +  iK 0ij @rij@ i )( @rij@ i @rij@tij + v0 @rij@ i + V 0(1 + nmen @@tij ))
 
@

1+nmen @@tij

@en V 0 i(2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i )@rij@ i
1CCCCCA :
The expressions BN and CN can be rewritten as follows:
BN = (E1 + E2) HORIREG   E3  V ERTI;
CN =   (E1 + E2)  V ERTI + E3 HORILOC;
with24
E1 =  (v0tij + V 0 nmen  i)K 0ij @(@rij=@ i)@en > 0,
E2 =  V 0 @(nm=en)@en (Kij +  iK 0ij @rij@ i ) > 0,
E3 =  V 0 iK 0ij
@

1+nmen @@tij

@en > 0,
HORIREG = (2v0   @rij@tij )K
0
ij
@rij
@tij
< 0,
HORILOC = (2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i )K 0ij @rij@ i < 0,
V ERTI = ( @rij@tij
@rij
@ i
+ v0 @rij@ i + V
0(1 + nmen @@tij ))K 0ij < 0.
We show that the sign of AN is always positive:
23 Invoking symmetry, i.e. Kij = k and K0ij = 1=F"

k
 8i;8j, we simplify the following expressions:
@((1 + "i)
nm=enP
j=1
Kij)=@en = (@ nmen =@en)Kij +  iK0ij @rij@i + nm=enP
j=1
 iK
0
ij(@
@rij
@i
=@en)
and (
P
k 6=j
K0ik
@
@tij
+K0ij
@rij
@tij
) = (1 + nmen @@tij ).
24We know that HORILOC < 0 from (5), HORIREG < 0 from (6) and V ERTI =
  @rij
@tij
@rij
@i
+ v0 @rij
@i
+ V 0

1 + nmen @@tij

K0ij =

  @rij
@tij
+ v0 + V 0
   en 1en K0ij < 0 from Lemma 2.
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Lemma 3: AN > 0
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Assume that AN < 0. Substituting the values
for @rij@ i ,
@rij
@tij
, @@tij and using v
0 = V 0, we obtain that AN < 0 iif25:
en > 1 + 2 (nm  1) (2V 0 nm 1nm )
(+1)2V 0 2nm 1
nm
: (11)
The condition (8) requires26:
en < V 0(nm 1)+(V 0 1)
(V 0  1nm)
; (12)
to make sure that the regional tax rate is strictly positive. We can show that the conditions
(11) and (12) are mutually incompatible. Indeed, 1 + 2 (nm  1) (2V
0 nm 1
nm )
((+1)2V 0 2nm 1nm )
<
V 0(nm 1)+(V 0 1)
(V 0  1nm)
iif (((3+ 1)V 0   2)nm+ (+ 1)) (  1) (nm  1)V 0 < 0, which is
impossible from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 (stated in Appendix A). Q.E.D.
It should be noted that the solution is a steady state of our linear system of di¤erential
equations, as every real eigenvalue of AN > 0 is negative.
6.3 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
Proofs refer to conditions and Lemmas stated in Appendices A and B.
 Sign of @Ni@en
LetBN 0 = K 02ij ( @(@rij=@ i)@en (v0tij+V 0 nmen  i)(2v0 @rij@tij )@rij@tij +
@

1+nmen @@tij

@en V 0 i( @rij@ i @rij@tij +
v0 @rij@ i + V
0(1 + nmen @@tij ))) such that BN  BN 0 = K 02ij @(nm=en)@en V 0( K0ij)(Kij +  iK 0ij @rij@ i )(2v0 
@rij
@tij
)
@rij
@tij
, which is always < 0 from (6) and given " i 2] 1; 0[. Demonstrating that BN 0 is
negative ensures that BN is negative too. After replacing @rij@ i ,
@rij
@tij
and @@tij by their values
and substituting v0 by V 0, the expression of BN 0 boils down to K 02ij
@( en 1en )
@en V 0( (tij +
nmen  i)  2V 0   nm 1nm  nm 1nm +  i   nm 1nm + (+ 1)V 0 en 1en ):Because K 02ij @( en 1en )@en V 0 > 0,
and
 
2V 0   nm 1nm

>
  nm 1nm + (+ 1)V 0 from Lemma 1, a su¢ cient condition to en-
sure that BN 0 is negative is that  (tij + nmen  i)nm 1nm +  i en 1en < 0 or, equally, tij nm 1nm +
 i
nm enen > 0, which is always true. Therefore BN 0 and consequently BN are negative.
Because AN > 0 from Lemma 3, @
N
i
@en = BNAN < 0. Q.E.D.
 Sign of @t
N
ij
@en
After replacing @rij@ i ,
@rij
@tij
and @@tij by their values and substituting v
0 by V 0, the
expression of CN simplies as follows: CN = K 02ijV
0 en 1en 1en2 ( 1en i (1 + 2nm (V 0   1)) +
25 (+ 1)2 V 0   2nm 1
nm
> 0 because it is the sum of two positive terms, i.e.,
 
2 + 1

V 0   nm 1
nm
, which
is positive from (6) and Lemma 1, and 2V 0   nm 1
nm
, which is positive from (6):
26
 
V 0   1
nm

> 0 from (6) and provided that nm > 3, which is always true.
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(tij +
nm
 K0ij (Kij +  iK
0
ij))( nm 1nm + (+ 1)V 0) +  i);which implies that CN > 0 iifen((tij + nm K0ij (Kij +  iK 0ij))   nm 1nm + (+ 1)V 0+  i) >   i (1 + 2nm (V 0   1)). We
know from Lemma 2 that the right-hand side is negative. Given " i 2]   1; 0[ and  nm 1nm + (+ 1)V 0 > 0 from Lemma 2, the condition is always true because en > 0.
Therefore CN is positive. Because AN > 0 from Lemma 3,
@tNij
@en = CNAN > 0. Q.E.D.
 Sign of @T
N
ij
@en = @Ni@en + @tNij@en
Summing @
N
i
@en and @tNij@en , and simplifying, we get:
@TNij
@en = 1ANen2K 02ij
0@ (v0tij + V 0 nmen  i + nm V 0( K0ij)(Kij +  iK 0ij @rij@ i ))(( @rij@tij + v0 + V 0) en 1en   (2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij )
+V 0 i en 1en (( @rij@tij + v0 + V 0)  (2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i ))
1A
The rst expression into the bracket, (v0tij+V 0 nmen  i+nm V 0( K0ij)(Kij+ iK 0ij @rij@ i ))(( @rij@tij +
v0 + V 0) en 1en   (2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij ), is negative because i) (v0tij + V 0 nmen  i + nm V 0( K0ij)(Kij +
 iK
0
ij
@rij
@ i
)) is always positive and ii) ( @rij@tij + v0 + V 0) en 1en   (2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij is negative
since  > 1 from Lemma 1 and nm 1nm >
en 1en .
The second expression into the bracket, V 0 i en 1en (( @rij@tij + v0 + V 0)  (2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i )),
is also negative. Indeed, we can show that the term ( @rij@tij + v0 + V 0)  (2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i ) is
negative iif v0 1   @rij@ i +2V 0 nmen + @rij@tij  V 0 1 (substracting  1 on each side). From (8),
we know that v0 1  (nmen V 0 1)(@rij@tij =@rij@ i ). A su¢ cient condition for ( @rij@tij + v0+V 0) 
(2V 0 nmen   @rij@ i ) to be  0 is that  @rij@ i + 2V 0 nmen + @rij@tij   V 0   1  (nmen V 0   1)(@rij@tij =@rij@ i )
or equally 0   1@rij
@i
(V 0(nmen   1) (en 2)en + (@rij@tij   @rij@ i )(1 + @rij@ i )) after factorization and
simplication, which is always true since nmen > 1, en  2 and @rij@tij > @rij@ i . Because AN > 0
from Lemma 3,
@TNij
@en is the sum of negative expressions. Therefore, @Tij@en < 0. Q.E.D.
6.4 Appendix D: Regional leadership
 Derivation of the equilibrium tax rates
Solving the regional governments program when she/he acts as a Stackelberg leader,
we obtain the following regional FOC:
nm=enX
j=1
0BBBBBB@
0ij(
@rij
@ i
+
@rij
@tij
@btij
@ i
+
P
k 6=j
@
@tik
@tFik
@ i
) + ( @@ i +
@
@tij
@btij
@ i
+
P
k 6=j
@
@tik
@tFik
@ i
)k
+v0(@
btij
@ i
Kij + tijK
0
ij(
@rij
@ i
+
@rij
@tij
@btij
@ i
+
P
k 6=j
@
@tik
@tFik
@ i
))
+V 0(
nm=enP
j=1
Kij +  i
nm=enP
j=1
K 0ij(
@rij
@ i
+
@rij
@tij
@btij
@ i
+
P
k 6=j
@
@tik
@tFik
@ i
))
1CCCCCCA = 0: (13)
At the symmetric equilibrium, using Kij = k 8i, 8j, the FOCs (13) and (2) reduce to:
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8<: (v0
@btij
@ i
+ V 0 nmen   (1 + @btij@ i ))k + v0tijK 0ij(@rij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tij )@btij@ i ) + V 0 i nmen K 0ij(@rij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tij )@btij@ i ) = 0
(v0   1)k + v0tijK 0ij @rij@tij + V 0 i(nmen @@tij + 1)K 0ij = 0
Solving this system of FOCs for all regions and cities, we derive the tax rates chosen by
regions and cities at the symmetric equilibrium when regional governments are Stackelberg
leaders27:
SRi =
(nmen V 0   1)(nm 1nm = en 1en )  (v0   1) (1  ((nm 1nm = en 1en )  1)@btij@ i )
 V 0K 0ij nm enen (1 + @btij@ i )
k
tSRij =
(v0   1) (nmen (1 + @btij@ i )  @btij@ i )  (nmen V 0   1)
 v0K 0ij nm enen (1 + @btij@ i )
k
For nmen V 0 > v0, we show that SRi > Ni and tSRij < tNij . In contrast, for nmen V 0 < v0, we
show that SRi < 
N
i and t
SR
ij > t
N
ij . It should be noted that we checked that conditions of
positivity and conditions of concavity stated in the Nash game are compatible with those
in the Stackelberg game.
 Comparative statics
Di¤erentiating the FOCs (13) and (2) w.r.t.  i, tij and en in this Stackelberg game
yields the following system of equations in matrix form:266666664
(2V 0 nmen + 2v0 @btij@ i   (@rij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tik )@btij@ i ))
K 0ij(@rij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tij )@btij@ i )
 K 0ij @rij@tij (
@rij
@ i
+ (1 + nmen @@tik )@btij@ i )
+v0K 0ij(
@btij
@ i
@rij
@tij
+ (
@rij
@ i
+ (1 + nmen @@tij )@btij@ i ))
+V 0K 0ij(1 +
nmen @@tij )
 K 0ij @rij@tij
@rij
@ i
+ v0K 0ij
@rij
@ i
+V 0K 0ij(1 +
nmen @@tij ) (2v
0   @rij@tij )K 0ij
@rij
@tij
377777775
"
@SRi
@en
@tSRij
@en
#
=
2666666664
 
0BBBBB@
(v0   1) @
@btij
@i
@en k + v0tijK 0ij(@
@rij
@i
@en + @

nmen @@tij

@en @btij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tij )@
@btij
@i
@en )
+V 0 @
nmen
@en (Kij +  iK 0ij(@rij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tij )@btij@ i ))
+V 0 nmen  iK 0ij(@
@rij
@i
@en + @

nmen @@tij

@en @btij@ i + (1 + nmen @@tij )@
@btij
@i
@en )
1CCCCCA
 V 0 iK 0ij
@ nmen
@en @@tij
3777777775
Using Cramers rule gives:
@SRi
@en = BSRASR and @tSRij@en = CSRASR ;
where after simplication due to symmetry, and using BN and CN dened in Appendix
B, we get:
27For @
btij
@i
= 0, we nd the same results as in the Nash game.
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ASR = K 02ij
0@ (2V 0 nmen + 2v0 @btij@ i   en 1en (1 + @btij@ i )) en 1en (1 + @btij@ i )(2v0   @rij@tij )@rij@tij
  en 1en (v0 + V 0   @rij@tij )( @rij@tij en 1en (1 + @btij@ i ) + v0((@btij@ i @rij@tij + en 1en (1 + @btij@ i )) + V 0 en 1en )
1A
BSR = BN (1 +
@btij
@ i
) +K 02ij ( D +
@ nmen
@en @@tij V 0 i(v0@rij@tij   V 0 en  1en )@btij@ i )
CSR = CN (1 +
@btij
@ i
) +K 02ij ( D
@btij
@ i
  @
nmen
@en @@tij V 0 i(2v0   en  1en )@btij@ i en  1en (1 + @btij@ i ))
whereD  (nmen V 0 K0ij (k+ iK 0ij en 1en )+v0 1 K0ij (k+tijK 0ij en 1en )+((en  2) nmen V 0 1) k K0ij ) 1en2 (v0+
V 0   @rij@tij ).
 Signs of @SRi@en and @tSRij@en
Using the condition that ensures the positivity of the regional tax rate, we show that
ASR > 0. The sign of @
SR
i
@en (resp. @tSRij@en ) is thus given by the sign of BSR (resp. CSR).
Provided that en > 2, the term D is always positive because we postulated that both "tij
and " i belong to the interval ]   1; 0[. Since BN < 0 and CN > 0 from Appendix C,
(1 +
@btij
@ i
) > 0, D > 0,
@ nmen
@en @@tij V 0 i(v0 @rij@tij   V 0 en 1en )@btij@ i < 0 and  @ nmen@en @@tij V 0 i(2v0  en 1en )@btij@ i en 1en (1 + @btij@ i ) > 0, we prove that @SRi@en < 0 and @t
SR
ij
@en > 0. Q.E.D.
6.5 Appendix E: Local leadership
Solving the local governments program when she/he acts as a Stackelberg leader, we
obtain the following FOC:
0ij(
@rij
@ i
@b i
@tij
+
@rij
@tij
) + ( @@ i
@b i
@tij
+ @@tij )k + v
0(Kij + tijK 0ij(
@rij
@ i
@b i
@tij
+
@rij
@tij
))
+V 0( i
P
k 6=j
K 0ik
@
@tij
+  iK
0
ij
@rij
@tij
+ @b i@tij
nm=enP
j=1
Kij +  i
nm=enP
j=1
K 0ij
@rij
@ i
@b i
@tij
) = 0 (14)
Invoking symmetry and factorizing, the local FOC (14) can be rewritten: (v0   1) k +
tijv
0K 0ij
@rij
@tij
+ V 0 iK 0ij
en 1en + @b i@tij ((V 0 nmen   1)k + v0tijK 0ij @rij@ i + V 0 i nmen K 0ij @rij@ i ) = 0. Since
(V 0 nmen   1)k + v0tijK 0ij @rij@ i + V 0 i nmen K 0ij @rij@ i = 0 from the regional FOC (1), the local
FOC (14) boils down (v0   1) k+ tijv0K 0ij @rij@tij +V 0 iK 0ij en 1en = 0, i.e., the local FOC in the
Nash game. As a consequence, we get that SLi = 
N
i , t
SL
ij = t
N
ij , and
@tSLij
@en = @tNij@en > 0,
@SLi
@en = @Ni@en < 0, @TSLij@en = @TNij@en < 0.
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